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                                                      Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between audit fees and market size (proxied 
by the sum of client sizes domiciled in a city) using the data of Australian Stock exchange (ASX) 
listed companies. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model and a client fixed effect 
model are applied to empirically test the relation between audit fees and market size. The client 
fixed effect model is used to control for omitted variable bias. Within this framework I apply two 
different audit fees measures as dependent variables and two groups of independent variables 
having different market size measures. This gives rise to eight different models. It is found that 
the relation between market size and audit fees is positively correlated and economically 
important. For example a one standard deviation increase in the market size of total assets leads 
to an increase in audit fees of about 6.47 percent. All of the found results are in line with previous 
published research by Hay, 2005; Sewon, O, and Kun Wang; Francis et al. 2005; Ferguson et al. 
2003.  
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Özet 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı denetim ücreti ile pazar hacminin arasındaki ilişkiyi (şehirde ikametgâhı 
bulunan tüm müşterilerinvekâleti alınarak) Avustralya borsasında yer alan şirketlerin verilerini 
kullanarak incelemektir. En küçük kareler regresyon ve kullanıcı sabit modelleri denetim ücreti 
ve pazar büyüklüğü arasındaki ilişkiye deneysel olarak uygulanmıştır. Kullanıcı sabit etki modeli, 
değişken sapmalarının tarafsız bir şekilde kontrol altında tutulması için kullanılır. Bu çerçevede, 
bağımlı değişkenler ve farklı pazar büyüklüğüne sahip bağımlı değişenlerin iki grubu şeklinde iki 
farklı denetim ücretlendirmesi uygulandı. Bu durumda,sekiz farklı modelin oluşturulmasına sebep 
oldu. Pazar hacmi ile denetim ücreti arasındaki ilişkinin pozitif korelasyonlu ve ekonomik açıdan 
önemli olduğu çalışmalardan saptanmıştır. Örneğin, toplam mevcudun pazar hacminin standart 
sapması arttığında denetim ücretlerinde yüzde 6.47 oranında artışa neden olmaktadır. Elde edilen 
bütün sonuçlar Hay, 2005; Sewon, O, ve Kun Wang; Francis ve arkadaşları 2005; Ferguson ve 
arkadaşları 2003 tarafından yayınlanan araştırmalar ile bağdaşmaktadır.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The seminal paper by Simunic [1980] introduced the “audit fee” model into the empirical 
accounting research literature.  This model seeks to explain the factors that cause changes in audit 
fees charged by audit firms to their clients.  Since that time, a number of common explanatory 
variables have been found to explain cross-sectional variation in audit fees, and these relations 
hold across different countries and industries. While client size, client complexity, client riskiness, 
and profitability have been typically identified as the most important classes of explanatory 
variables for audit fees, little is known about the relation between audit fees and audit market size 
(hereafter market size). Related audit literature suggests that this relation could be either positive 
or negative. In this study market sizes are measured as the sum of client assets/sales for all clients 
domiciled in that city. 
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate empirically the relation between the market 
size and audit fees. To do this I used two different models: a linear regression model and a client 
fixed regression model.  In the first model the natural logarithm of audit fees is taken as the 
dependent variable, while in the second the difference of the natural logarithm of audit fees for the 
financial years 2013 and 2014 acts as the dependent variable. The Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression model used in this study includes proxy variables for client attributes such as client 
size, client complexity, client riskiness and profitability, and auditors’ attributes such as size of the 
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auditor and engagement attributes, that prior studies have found to be important explanatory 
variables for fees. This regression model is similar to the model used by some important studies in 
this area such as Francis et al. [2005] and Francis and Stokes [2003]. The fixed effect regression 
model used in this study includes differences of client attributes, auditors’ attributes and 
engagement attributes over the financial years 2013 to 2014. 
The OLS and fixed effect regression models are estimated using a dataset that is hand-collected 
from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) website. Specifically, the electronic copies of annual 
reports for the financial years 2013 and 2014 of ASX listed companies are downloaded and 
relevant data to estimate the models are obtained from those annual reports. For the OLS 
regression model, a sample size totalling 1,836 companies and for the client fixed effect 
regression model a sample size totalling 1,467 companies is used.  
Both the OLS and client fixed effect regression results suggest that there is a positive association 
between the audit fees and market size. Two different measures of audit fees and market sizes are 
used to check the robustness of the results. These results are supported by positive Pearson 
correlation coefficients between market size and audit fees ranging from about 0.248 to about 
0.349 (see Table 14). 
The relations between market size and audit fees are not only statistically significant but also 
economically important. The economic importance becomes more prominent when market size is  
measured using total assets. For example a one standard deviation increase in the market size of 
total assets leads to an increase in audit fees of about 6.47 percent.  
This study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review of the audit fees and its 
variability with client size, complexity and risk, auditor attributes and engagement attributes. In 
section 0, prior studies informing the relations between audit fees and market size are discussed 
and the research hypothesis to be tested in this study is presented.  
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Chapter 3 presents the audit fees model, specification of the audit fees model, the method of data 
collection and its sources. In Chapter 3, the descriptive statistics by industries and descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the OLS regression model and fixed effect regression model are 
also shown and discussed in detail. 
Chapter 4 presents the model section of this study. The results of the OLS regression model and 
the fixed effect regression model are discussed in detail in this chapter. Chapter 5 concludes the 
study, including a discussion of the main results and their implications for audit researchers, 
regulators, audit clients and auditors. 
 
1.1  Motivation of the study:  
 
I have assessed in this study the effect of market size on audit fees. Despite of the huge research 
based on the seminal work of the Simunic’s audit fees model, no clear relation has been observed 
between market size and audit fees. The relation is important for audit researchers, audit 
regulators, auditors and audit clients. This study contributes improving the audit fee model. For 
example I found in the study that the market size is an important factor explaining the size of the 
audit fees. To reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias it seems important to include the 
market size as an explanatory variable in the model. This also has some practical implications for 
auditors, audit clients and regulators. For example, given that larger markets size have higher fees, 
costs saving may be easier to find than in smaller markets.  There may also be more potential in 
term of costs for the auditors to adopt different competitive strategies in larger markets. It would 
therefore be wise for auditors to consider the effects of market size in designing competitive 
strategies. For example in smaller markets, the costs are relatively lower and so the competitive 
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strategy in these markets should be based on the efficiency and quality of services rather than on 
costs.  The study has also importance for audit clients. For example, audit quality may change if a 
client moves from a smaller market to a larger market and vice versa. It is also important to note 
that cost changes if a client moves from a smaller market to a larger market and vice versa.  There 
are also some other non-audit related factors such as access to suppliers which the clients should 
consider before moving to another market. Finally, for regulators, it would seem that drawing 
conclusions about implications of reduced audit fees for audit quality should also take into 
consideration the size of the market.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Since the seminal work of Simunic (1980), an expanding stream of audit literature has examined 
the factors explaining the amount of audit fees paid by audit clients to their auditors. This is called 
the pricing of audit services. A large number of explanatory variables have been examined, of 
which the most important variables are those proxing for client size, client complexity, and client 
riskiness. The literature generally uses the audit fee model proposed by Simunic (1980). In this 
model the natural logarithm of audit fees is explained as a linear function of proxies for the 
various client attributes (Craswell and Francis, 1999).  
In recent times, other important explanatory variables have also been found for audit fees. For 
example, in studies examining the effect of  auditor size, the researcher is interested in answering 
the question of whether clients are willing to pay a higher fee to “Big4” audit firms than fees paid 
to “non-Big 4” audit firms. “Big4”audit firms are measured by a dummy variable in the regression 
model, where the variable “Big4” is set equal to one if the audit firm is PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu, KPMG or Ernst and Young, and zero otherwise. Findings about the 
effect of this “Big4” variable on audit fees are mixed. Some studies have suggested evidence of a 
fee premium paid to “Big4” audit firms (Palmrose, 1996; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Chan et al., 
1993), and others have failed to find the evidences of such a premium (Firth, 1985; Chung and 
Lindsay, 1988; Brinn et al., 1994). Some research studies have also suggested different fee 
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premiums for different Big4 audit firms (Taylor 1997; Simon and Taylor 2002) and fee premiums 
for industry specialist audit firms. 
Auditor industry specialization is another important topic in the audit literature. Researchers have 
defined auditor specialists in different ways. Some researchers have defined auditor specialists as 
auditors with the largest market share in a given industry, and others have defined them as those 
with a market share in a given industry exceeding a certain cut-off level (Jiang et al. 2012). The 
importance of industry specialized auditors is attributable to the research findings that auditor  
industry  expertise  is  associated  with  better  auditor  performance  and  higher audit  quality.  
For better auditor performance, researchers argue that industry specialized auditors produce a 
more accurate and efficient audit. For instance, Solomon and Shields (1999) have performed an 
experiment, and showed that industry specialist auditors achieved more work and more accurate 
financial statements for their industries of specialization relative to other industries.  
A group of researchers have investigated the effects of industry specializations on audit pricing.  
For example, Casterella et al. (2004) find that a fee premium exists for industry specialist auditors 
in the small client segment. Also audit fees decrease as a company becomes increasingly larger 
relative to the auditor’s industry clients. This suggests that larger clients have stronger bargaining 
power resulting in lower fees. Huang et al. (2007)  test whether the results of Casterella et al. 
(2004) still hold for the post-SOX period and they find that in the post-SOX period (i.e., 2003 and 
2004) the negative association between audit fees and client size extends to both small and large 
client segments (Jiang et al. 2012).   
Client profitability is considered another measure of risk. It reflects the extent to which the auditor 
may be exposed to loss in the event that a client is not financially viable (Simunic, 1980). In 
general, the worse the performance of the client, the more risk to the auditor and the higher the 
audit fee is expected to be. 
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Leverage also measures the risk of a client failing, which potentially exposes the auditor to loss 
(Simunic 1980). Consequently, researchers generally expect to find a positive association between 
the leverage of a company and its audit fees (e.g. Gist 1994b). The combined meta-results support 
the expected relationship between leverage and audit fees (Hay et al. 2006). 
The most important determinant of audit fees is audit client size, which is expected to have a 
positive relationship with audit fees (Simunic 1980). Prior studies suggest the existence of a direct 
relationship between the amount of audit fees and the audit client size. (Simunic, 1980, 1984; 
Maher et al., 1992; Francis, 1984; Firth, 1985; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1996; Simon 
and Francis, 1988; Taylor and Baker, 1981; Chung and Lindsay, 1988; Chan et al.1993;  Craswell  
and  Francis,  1999;  DeFond  et al.,  2000).  A positive effect of client size for audit fees is also 
expected, since the audit firm is expected to do more audit work as the client size increases 
(Atanasiu, Iosivan; 2008).  
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2.1 AUDIT FEES AND MARKET SIZE: 
 
 
In the following sections I develop my hypothesis about the relation between the pricing of audit 
services and market size with reference to most of the relevant studies. As the relations between 
these aforementioned variables are unclear, I provide two separate sections, each covering a 
different directional prediction. First, I discuss why the relation between fees and market size 
could be negative and then I discuss why this relation could be positive. 
 
Why would the relation between audit fees and market size be negative? 
The arguments for a negative relation between audit fees and market size are related to the fixed 
cost recovery, competition and economies of scale. 
Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) noted that oligopolists’ average sales must rise with increasing 
market sizes. The mark-up (difference in cost and price) falls with increased sales since they must 
recover the fixed cost with a lower mark-up by selling more. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) 
also note that in a large market, the competitors cannot use their product placement decisions to 
protect their mark-ups indefinitely which lead to reductions in price-cost mark-ups. They argued 
for a reduction of cost with increases in market size due to more production which leads to a 
reduction of fixed cost per unit (product or service) and shrinking in price-cost mark up while 
increasing market size due to increasing the competition in the market. Sirois and Simunic (2011) 
argue that market size has a negative association with the audit price due to investments in audit 
technology increasing with increases in market size which lowers audit production cost (effort 
cost). Melitz and Ottaviano (2006) showed that a bigger market exhibits larger and more 
productive firms as well as more product variety, lower prices, and lower mark-ups. So increases 
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in the market size reduce cost-price mark-ups. This suggests a negative association of the market 
size and prices. Similar results have been shown by the Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005). They 
suggested that large market size increases the competition among the industries, and decreases the 
mark-ups. In this study, authors have compared percentage changes of market size and 
competition with decrease in price-cost mark-up. Berger et al. (2001) studied the relationship of 
the loan price and market size for large banks and market size for small banks separately. They 
suggested that the loan price is negatively associated with the market size of both the large bank 
and market size of the small banks. Elberfeld (2001) showed that with increases in market size, 
the output of each downstream firm grows, so that each firm is better able to achieve scale 
economies in upstream production. As a result, buying the input in the market becomes less 
attractive which leads to reduction in the prices. Thus the presence of scale economies in larger 
markets and the willingness to pass them onto clients suggests that one might observe a negative 
relation between audit fees and market size. Evidence from the US suggests that auditors are 
willing to pass on the audit fees benefits of scale economies when those auditors have a large 
number of clients in a city (Fung et al. 2012). Findings and arguments from the above studies 
suggest a negative relation between market size and pricing of audit services. 
Why would the relation in the audit fees and the market size be positive? 
In contrast to the previous discussions, labour and other production costs and work quality-related 
reasons, provide justification for expecting that the relation between audit fees and market size 
could be positive.  
In some countries, there are metropolitan centers whose costs are higher than the rest of the 
country. For example, Hay (2005) suggests that costs may be higher in London than in other cities 
in the United Kingdom, higher in Amsterdam than in other cities in the Netherlands and higher in 
Oslo than in other cities in Norway. Sewon and Kun Wang (2009) suggest that audit fees are 
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positively associated with the size of the city. They report that audit fees are significantly higher 
for larger cities than smaller cities, because the effects of low-balling are more persuasive in 
smaller cities, where the audit markets are more contestable due to competition. 
Sirois and Simunic (2011), DeAngelo (1981), and Simunic (1984) suggest that the bigger the 
market size, the higher the audit quality and as a result the audit fees will also be higher. 
Numerous studies in the audit literature report a positive relation between audit fees, audit effort 
and auditor quality. Caramanis and Lennox (2008) for example, find that more hours worked by 
Greek auditors is associated with lower earnings management. This suggests that the higher effort 
exerted by auditors in larger markets could explain a positive coefficient for the market size 
measure in regression models explaining audit fees. This argument is consistent with Sundgren 
and Svanstrom (2011). 
Given that there are competing predictions for the relation between audit fees and market size, my 
research hypothesis in null form can be stated as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS:  There is no relation between market size and audit fees 
I test this hypothesize by estimating a linear and a fixed effect regression model. Both approaches 
are discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 RESEARCH METHODOLGY: 
 
 3.1 AUDIT FEES MODELS: 
 
The research hypothesis is first empirically tested by estimation of an OLS regression model with 
the natural logarithm of audit fees (FEE) used as the dependent variable and subsequently by a 
client fixed effect regression model. The model is similar to the model used by Ferguson et at. 
(2003) with Australian data, and is based on the seminal model proposed by Simunic (1980) and 
adapted for recent studies as follows: 
𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 = 𝑤0 +   𝑤1𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤2𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤3𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤5𝑀𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸(𝑃𝐴𝑅)𝑖𝑡 +
𝑤6𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤7𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝑤8𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝑤9𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝑤11𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤12𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤13𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤14𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝑤15𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤16𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝑣𝑖𝑡 .                                                                                                                                       (1) 
I use for client “i”, the explained variable FEESit  to be either the natural logarithm of total audit 
fees or the natural logarithm of audit fees of the parent audit firm measured at time t. Additional to 
total audit fees, which are more commonly used in the audit literature, fees paid to the parent 
entity auditor have also been used in this study to assess the robustness of the results. The error 
terms 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the random variable for client i at time t (t=2013,2014) and these random variables are 
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assumed to be independent and normally distributed with zero mean and the same variance for 
every i and t. 
The explanatory variable MARKET SIZEıt denotes either the total assets or the total sale of the 
client at the city level. Both market size measures together with total audit fees and parent audit 
fees are then used separately giving rise to four different estimation results.  This is done to test the 
robustness of the results. 
The following client fixed effect (changes) model is estimated: 
𝛥𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 =
𝑤0 +   𝑤1𝛥𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤2𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤3𝛥𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤4𝛥𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤5𝛥𝑀𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸(𝑃𝐴𝑅)𝑖𝑡 +
𝑤6𝛥𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤7𝛥𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝑤8𝛥𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤9𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤10𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝑤11𝛥𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤12𝛥𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤13𝛥𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐽𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤14𝛥𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤15𝛥𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 +
𝑤16𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                         (2) 
The client fixed effect model is used to reduce the threat of omitted variable bias. It assists in 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time and correlated with the 
independent variables. An example of such an omitted variable could be a client’s corporate 
governance system. The effects of variables such as these are removed from the analysis through 
differencing. The variables used in the client fixed effect model are the differences over the 
financial years 2014 to 2013 (ti-ti-1). 
Before introducing the definitions of the explanatory and explained variables, I explain a few 
terms here. 
Total Assets:  Anything that a business owns and has value and can be converted to cash. It is 
further categorised in current and non-current assets. For example, cash, building, 
machinery, supplies.  
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Current Assets: Anything that a business owns and has value and can be converted to cash in less 
than one year. For examples, cash, supplies, inventory. 
Total liability:  The aggregate of all debts an individual or company is liable for.  It can be split 
into two basic categories as current liability and non-current liability. E.g. interest 
payable, wages payable, long term debt. 
Current liability: Current liabilities are those liabilities which are due within one year or less, e.g. 
wages payable taxes. 
Inventory: The raw materials, work-in-process goods and completely finished goods that are 
considered to be the portion of a business's assets that are ready or will be ready for 
sale. 
Business segment: Business segments are based on the nature of the products or services the firms 
provide to the market. 
Geographic segment: Geographic segments are based on the location of products or services. 
 
 3.2 VARIABLES DEFINITIONS: 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
FEETOTAL = Natural logarithm of total audit fees (in whole Australian dollars) paid to all auditors 
of group entities and winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile value. 
FEEPARENT  = Natural logarithm of audit fees (in whole Australian dollars) paid to the auditor of the 
parent entity and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile value. 
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ASSETS = Natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm and winsorized at its first and 99
th 
percentile values. I expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this 
variable. 
CATA = Current assets divided by total assets and winsorized at its first and 99
th
 percentile values. 
I expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
FOREIGN = Number of FOREIGN subsidiaries divided by total subsidiaries. I expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile. I 
expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
MSHAREPAR = Industry market share of the partner at city level. I expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
 
MARKET SIZE  = Market size is calculated in two ways, by using total asset and by using total 
revenue and have winsorized these variables at their first and 99
th
 
percentile values. 
i. The Natural logarithm of the sum of the total assets in a city.  
ii. The Natural logarithm of the sum of the total sale revenue in a city.  
I have no expectation for the sign of the coefficient of these variables. 
NSEG = Natural logarithm of the sum of business and geographic segments. I expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
QUICK = (Current assets - inventory) divided by total assets and winsorized at its first and 99
th
 
percentile values. I expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this 
variable. 
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REPORTLAG = Natural logarithm of the number of days from the client’s year end to the date of 
the audit report. I expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this 
variable. 
ROA = Net income divided by total assets and winsorized at its first and 99
th
 percentile values. I 
expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
SALE = Natural logarithm of the client’s total revenue and winsorized at its first and 99th 
percentile values. I expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this 
variable. 
LOSS = One if the client’s net income is less than zero, and zero otherwise. I expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of this variable.  
OPINION = One if the auditor issues a going concern opinion, and zero otherwise. I expect a 
positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
NONJUNE = One if the client’s fiscal year end is not June 30, and zero otherwise. I expect a 
positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
BIG4 = One if the audit firm is any of the big four audit firms: Ernst & Young, 
Pricewaterhousecoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, or KPMG, and 
zero otherwise. I expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this 
variable. 
IND_FEij  = One if the auditee is classified in a given GICS industry group and zero otherwise. 
There are total of twenty four industries and consequently twenty three 
industry dummies in the estimated OLS regression. 
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Change variables have the following definitions. 
ΔFEETOTAL = The difference of FEETOTAL for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and 
winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. 
ΔFEEPARENT   = The difference of FEEPARENT  for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and 
winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values.  
ΔASSETS = The difference of ASSETS for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and 
winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
ΔCATA = The difference of CATA for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and winsorized 
at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
ΔFOREIGN = The difference of FOREIGN for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and 
winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
ΔLEV = The difference of LEV for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and winsorized at 
the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
ΔMSHAREPAR = The difference of MSHAREPAR for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and 
winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
 
ΔMARKET SIZE (ASSETS) = The difference of MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) for financial year 2014 
and financial year 2013 and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile 
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values. I have no expectation for the size of the coefficient of this 
variable. 
ΔMARKET SIZE (SALE) = The difference of MARKET SIZE (SALE) for financial year 2014 and 
financial year 2013 and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile 
values. I have no expectation for the size of the coefficient of this 
variable. 
ΔNSEG = The difference of NSEG for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and winsorized 
at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
ΔQUICK = The difference of QUICK for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and 
winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a negative 
sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
ΔREPORTLAG = The difference of REPORTLAG for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 
and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a 
positive sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
ΔROA = The difference of ROA for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and winsorized at 
the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a negative sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
ΔSALE = The difference of SALE for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and winsorized 
at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
ΔLOSS = The difference of LOSS for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and winsorized 
at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
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ΔOPINION = The difference of OPINION for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and 
winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
ΔNONJUNE = The difference of NONJUNE for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and 
winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of this variable. 
ΔBIG4 = The difference of BIG4 for financial year 2014 and financial year 2013 and winsorized 
at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. I expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
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 3.3 DESCRIPTION OF AUDIT FEES MODEL 
 
The OLS regression model (given in section 0) has various continuous independent variables and 
dummy variables to control for the attributes of auditors, clients, and the audit engagement. 
Control variables are used to control for client-specific factors such as size, risk, and complexity, 
and auditor-specific factors such as industry specialization by the audit partner and the auditor’s 
opinion on his client’s financial statements. Consistent with recent literature, control variables for 
clients with non-standard fiscal year-ends and the length of the reporting lag are also used in the 
model. 
More specifically, size of the client is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (ASSETS), 
and the natural logarithm of sales SALE, industry market share of the partner at the city level 
(MSHAREPAR), the natural logarithm of the number of business and geographic segments (NSEG), 
the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries (FOREIGN), and the ratio of current assets to 
total assets (CATA). The auditee risk variables are the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (LEV), 
the return on assets (ROA), the ratio of the difference of current assets and inventory to total assets 
(QUICK), a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the auditee has made a loss (LOSS), and a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the auditor issues a going concern opinion (OPINION). 
The effects of a non-standard year-end are controlled for using the variable (NONJUNE), which 
takes a value of 1 if the auditee’s year-end is not June 30, 2013. Each of these control variables has 
been examined in the meta- analysis of Hay et al. (2006) and has been found to be a significant 
determinant of audit fees. Audit quality is controlled by the use of the variable (BIG4), which takes 
the value of 1 if the client is audited by a big four audit firm. The natural logarithm of the number 
of days between 30
th
 June 2013 and the audit report date REPORTLAG is used to proxy for audit 
delay. The auditee’s industry is controlled for, by using dummy variables (IND_FEi) as listed in 
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section 3.2,  which take the value of 1 if the auditee is classified in one of the twenty four GICS 
industry group, e.g. if it is “Energy” then 1, otherwise 0. There are twenty three such dummy 
variables denoted by (IND_FEi) in the model. 
Logarithm transformation is used on the independent variables such as ASSETS, MARKET SIZE, 
NSEG, REPORTLAG, and SALE and the dependent variable (FEE), in order to improve the 
linearity of these variables. The dependent variable and all independent variables except for 
REPORTLAG and the dummy variables are winsorized at their 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values to 
reduce the influence of extreme values unduly influencing the results. REPORTLAG is not 
winsorized because it has no outliers.  
In the audit fee model, fees are positively dependent on the amount of work the auditor has 
performed (ASSETS, SALE), the client’s complexity (NSEG, FOREIGN), the client’s inherent risk 
(CATA, QUICK, LEV, ROA, LOSS, OPINION), the auditor’s reputation (BIG4), and the time 
taken to complete the audit (REPORTLAG), while fees are negative dependent if the client has a 
year end in an off-peak month (NONJUNE).  
As noted above, two market size measures are used to assess the robustness of the results, namely 
MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) and MARKET SIZE (SALE). The correlation coefficient between these 
two measures is 0.924 as shown in Table 13, indicating that they capture much of the same 
information.  The correlation is not perfect however. 
With regard to the client fixed effect model (2), the difference of the size of the client for financial 
year 2013 and 2014 is calculated,  as the change in total assets (ΔASSETS), the change of market 
size (ΔMARKET SIZE), which are the difference of the natural logarithm of total assets or total 
sales of firm at city level (MARKET SIZE), the change of industry market share of partner at city 
level (ΔMSHAREPAR), and the difference of all other variables used in the OLS regression model 
for financial years 2013 to 2014 have been used in the client fixed effect model. Though change 
 
 
22 
 
variables are the differences of the values whose natural logarithm has been taken, the linearity 
assumption has already been satisfied. The dependent variables and all independent variables 
except REPORTLAG were winsorized at their 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values to reduce the influence 
of extreme values on the results. REPORTLAG is not winsorized because it has no outlier. 
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 3.4  DATA COLLECTION 
 
The data comprises of ASX listed companies for the financial years 2013 to 2104. All data are 
obtained from client’s electronic copies of annual reports for the year 2013 and 2104, downloaded 
from the ASX website:   
(http://www.asx.com.au/asx/statistics/announcements.do). 
The initial sample (N=2139) comprises all listed companies of the ASX for the 2013 fiscal year. 
There were 303 companies eliminated from the dataset for the 2013 fiscal year reducing the 
sample size to 1836 companies. The reasons and other details about eliminated companies from 
the dataset are given in Table 1. The derivation of the sample for the financial year 2014 is shown 
in Table 2.  
The dataset consists of financial information of the firms, remuneration fees for audit and non-
audit services paid by the firms to the auditors, and number of segments and subsidiaries. 
Segments have been classified into two groups, business segments and geographic segments. 
Business segments are based on the nature of the products or services the firms provide to the 
market, and geographic segments are based on the location of products or services. The data set 
also has information about the number of subsidiaries of a company. It is classified based on their 
location as local or foreign subsidiaries. The data also has the information about the auditor, 
auditor partner, audit report date, and audit office location from where the audit is carried out.  
The audit fees are categorized as parent auditor and other auditors. Parent auditors are the auditors 
of the parent entity in the consolidated group, while other auditors are the auditors of any other 
entity in the group, such as a foreign subsidiary.  
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Table 1: Sample Derivation- 2013 
 
 
 N 
Listed Companies  2,139 
Less:  
“Not applicable GICS codes”             164 
 “Report not uploaded till June 2014”             52 
“Suspended Companies”          65 
“Incomplete  information”                         22 
Total                                                   
 
303 
Final Regression Sample                                                                                                   1836 
The companies whom GICS code is not applicable include all those companies that are not assigned to a sub-industry 
according to the definition of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard).  
Report not uploaded till June 2014 includes all those companies that didn’t uploaded their annual report for 
financial 2013 on website till June 2014. 
Suspended companies includes all those companies which are delisted from the Australian Securities 
exchange (ASX) listed companies for financial year 2013. 
Incomplete information uploaded companies are those who do not have sufficient information to measure 
all the required variables.  
 
The financial information such as total assets of the company, current assets, inventory, total 
liabilities, current liabilities, net profit/losses and total revenues has been collected for each 
company. 
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Table 2 Sample Derivation- 2014 
 
 
 N 
Listed Companies  1,918 
Less:  
“Not applicable GICS codes”             165 
 “Report not uploaded till December 2014”           163 
     “Suspended Companies”       71 
“Incomplete  information”    
       “Missing reports for year 2013” 
27 
27 
Total                                                   
 
453 
Final  Sample                                                                                                       1465 
The companies whom GICS code is not applicable include all those companies that are not assigned to a sub-industry 
according to the definition of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard).  
Report not uploaded till December 2014 includes all those companies that didn’t uploaded their annual 
report for financial 2014 on website till December 2014. 
Suspended companies included all those companies which are delisted from Australian Securities exchange 
(ASX) listed companies for financial year 2014. 
Incomplete information uploaded companies are those who do not have sufficient information to measure 
all the required variables. 
Missing reports for 2013, include all those companies whose data were unavailable for financial year 2013. 
These are deleted from the dataset because I am not able to take the difference of financial year 2013 and 
2014. 
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Table 3: Currencies used to report financial data 
 Symbol Number of companies 
 
Australian Dollar AUD 1732 
US Dollar USD 72 
New Zealand Dollar NZD 11 
Singapore Dollar SGD 6 
Canadian Dollar CAD 5 
Euro EUR 4 
Hong Kong Dollar HKD 3 
Papua New Guinean kina PGK 2 
Chines Renminbi CNY 1 
Total   1836 
The numbers of companies in the dataset who report in particular foreign currencies are given. For instance 
there are 1732 companies in the dataset who have shown their values in Australian dollars (AUD) 
 
There are 103 firms in the sample (N=1836) whose audit reports are presented in foreign 
currencies i.e. currencies other than Australian dollars (AUD). The details about different 
currencies are given in Table 3. All foreign currencies are converted to Australian dollars (AUD) 
using the spot rate of foreign exchange at the companies financial year end, given on the website: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/currencies/ . 
The currency proportions are the same for the changes model sample as OLS regression model 
sample, so a separate table is not shown. 
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  3.5  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the financial year 2013 of the variables used in the 
ordinary least square (OLS) model (1). As is common in studies using Australian data there is 
wide variation in client size. Consistent with previous research the distributions of audit fee 
variables are highly positively skewed. For example, the average audit fee is 458765 and the range 
is from 1000 to 18848000. To reduce the impact of outliers, the natural log of variables are used 
and some variables are winsorized (consistent with Ferguson et al. 2003). The mean of LOSS 
shows that about 64% of companies in the sample have reported a loss in financial year 2013, 
consistent with the negative median ROA. The variable OPINION, which is the indicator variable 
for the issuing of going concern shows that about 27% of the companies have been issued a going 
concern by the auditors. The sample consists of 20% of BIG4 companies and 80% of Non-BIG4 
companies. BIG4 companies comprise Ernst & Young, Pricewaterhousecoopers, Deloitte Touché 
Tohmatsu, and KPMG. The NONJUNE indicator variable shows that about 15.6% of the 
companies in sample did not end their fiscal year at 30
th
 June of 2013.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression model (1) 
(The table is continued on the next page).
VARIABLES         MIN   MEDIAN MEAN         MAX STDDEV         P1                 P99 
 
 
FEETOTAL 1000 65950 458765 18848000 5102124 9525 4820080 
LOG  FEETOTAL 0.3979 4.819 4.941 6.709 0.537 3.980 6.706 
FEEPARENT 1000 61700 413584 18848000 5064923     8508 3463840 
LOG FEEPARENT 0.3955 4.790 4.903 6.661 0.516 3.960 6.641 
ASSET 4.957 7.386 7.374 10.398 1.072 4.968 10.380 
CATA 0 0.318 0.399 1.000 0.315 0 1.000 
FOREIGN 0 0 0.296 1.000 0.366 0 1.000 
LEV 0.003 0.245 0.457 7.409 0.962 0.003 7.370 
MARKET SIZE (ASSET) 9.416 11.468 11.701 12.363 0.615 9.416 12.363 
MARKET SIZE (SALE) 9.416 11.365 11.210 11.403 0.334 9.416 11.403 
NSEG 0.301 0.477 0.507 1.041 0.209 0.301 1.041 
MSHAREPAR 0 0.022 0.114 1.000 0.234 0 1.000 
QUICK 0 0.266 0.363 1.000 0.310 0 1.000 
REPORTLAG 0.954 1.929 1.869 4.620 0.168 1.505 2.136 
ROA -17.080 -0.084 -0.568 1.051 2.072 -16.736 1.034 
SALE 3.309 6.405 6.499 9.952 1.607 3.332 9.943 
BIG4 0 0 0.200 1.000 0.400 0 1.000 
LOSS 0 1.000 0.645 1.000 0.479 0 1.000 
NONJUNE 0 0 0.156 1.000 0.363 0 1.000 
OPINION 0 0 0.270 1.000 0.444 0 1.000 
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Table 4 is continued 
  The variables have the following definitions. 
  FEETOTAL= Natural logarithm of total audit fees (in Australian dollars) paid to all auditors of group entities and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 
percentile values. 
  FEE PARENT   = Natural logarithm of audit fees (in Australian dollars) paid to the auditor of the parent entity and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 
percentile values. 
  ASSETS= Natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm and winsorized at its first and 99
th
percentile values.  
  CATA= Current assets divided by total assets and winsorized at its first and 99
th
 percentile values. 
  FOREIGN=Number of FOREIGN subsidiaries divided by total subsidiaries.  
  LEV= Total liabilities divided by total assets and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. 
MARKET SIZE (CITY)=Market size is calculated by two ways, by using total asset and by using total revenue and have winsorized   at their first 
and 99
th
 percentile values. 
I. The Natural logarithm of the sum of the total assets in a city.  
II. The Natural logarithm of the sum of the total Sale Revenue in a city.  
NSEG= Natural logarithm of the sum of business and geographic segments. 
MSHAREPAR= Industry market share of the partner at city level. 
QUICK= (Current assets - inventory) divided by total assets and winsorized at its first and 99
th
   percentile values.  
REPORTLAG= Natural logarithm of the difference of year end and date of audit report  
ROA= Net income divided by total assets and winsorized at its first and 99
th
 percentile values.  
SALE= Natural logarithm of total revenue and winsorized at its first and 99
th
 percentile values. 
BIG4= One if the audit firm is any of the big four audit firms Ernst & Young, Pricewaterhousecoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, or KPMG, 
and zero otherwise 
LOSS= One if the net income is less than zero, and zero otherwise.  
NONJUNE= One if the client’s fiscal year end is not June 30, and zero otherwise.  
OPINION= One if the auditor issue a going concern opinion, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression model (2) 
(The table is continued on the next page)
VARIABLES                    MIN     MEDIAN             MEAN              MAX    STDDEV           P1         P99 
 
 
ΔFEETOTAL -2336000 500 3312 2457146 517688 -449676 533412 
ΔLOG  FEETOTAL     -0.629 -0.004 0.002 0.843 0.177 -0.577 0.786 
ΔFEEPAREN -2336000 658 4625 2457146 511496 -439070 533412 
ΔLOG FEEPARENT -0.629 -0.007 0.007 0.843 0.184 -0.620 0.837 
ΔASSET -0.629 0.002 -0.0006 0.843 0.267 -0.629 0.843 
ΔCATA -0.629 0.0005 0.0009 0.843 0.222 -0.629 0.830 
ΔFOREIGN -0.629 0 -0.047 0.843 0.210 -0.629 0.521 
ΔLEV -0.629 -0.002 0.018 0.843 0.248 -0.629 0.843 
ΔMARKET SIZE 
(ASSET) 
-0.629 -0.035 0.173 0.843 0.280 -0.629 0.843 
ΔMARKET SIZE 
(SALE) 
-0.629 0.025 -0.049 0.843 0.172 -0.629 0.473 
ΔNSEG -0.602 0 -0.020 0.653 0.106 -0.397 0.301 
ΔMSHAREPAR -0.998 -0.001 0.006 0.996 0.134 -0.468 0.515 
ΔQUICK -0.629 0.0008 0.001 0.843 0.224 -0.629 0.830 
ΔREPORTLAG -2.654 0 -0.003 0.787 0.128 -0.350 0.268 
ΔROA -0.629 0.001 0.001 0.843 0.371 -0.629 0.843 
ΔSALE -0.629 -0.011 -0.0002 0.843 0.424 -0.629 0.843 
ΔBIG4 -1 0 -0.057 1 0.380 -1 1 
ΔLOSS -1 0 -0.120 1 0.481 -1 1 
ΔNONJUNE -1 0 -0.029 1 0.181 -1 0 
ΔOPINION -1 0 -0.028 1 0.416 -1 1 
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Table 5 is continued 
Change variables have the following definitions. 
ΔFEETOTAL= The difference of FEETOTAL for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. 
ΔFEEPARENT = The difference of FEEPARENT for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values  
ΔASSETS= The difference of ASSETS for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  
ΔCATA= The difference of CATA for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  
ΔFOREIGN= The difference of FOREIGN for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  
ΔLEV= The difference of LEV for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. 
ΔMARKET SIZE (ASSETS) = The difference of MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the 
first and 99
th
 percentile values.  
ΔMARKET SIZE (SALE) = The difference of MARKET SIZE (SALE) for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 
99
th
 percentile values.  
ΔNSEG= The difference of NSEG for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. 
ΔMSHAREPAR=The difference of MSHAREPAR for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99
th
 percentile values. 
ΔQUICK= The difference of QUICK for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. 
ΔREPORTLAG= The difference of REPORTLAG for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile 
values. 
ΔROA= The difference of ROA for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. 
ΔSALE= The difference of SALE for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  
ΔBIG4= The difference of BIG4 for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. 
ΔLOSS=The difference of LOSS for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. 
ΔNONJUNE= The difference of NONJUNE for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  
ΔOPINION= The difference of OPINION for financial year 2013 and financial year 2014 and winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values. 
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Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the client fixed effect model (2). 
The mean of ΔLOSS indicates that about 12% of companies were not in loss in financial year 
2013 but were in loss in year 2014. The negative mean of ΔROA is consistent with the negative 
mean of ROA for financial year 2013. The mean of ΔOPINION indicates that about 2.8% of the 
companies who had not received a going concern opinion from their auditors have been received 
a going concern from their auditors in financial year 2014. The means of ΔMARKET SIZE 
(ASSETS) and ΔMARKET SIZE (SALE) indicate that market size (assets) have increased by about 
17% while market size (sales) have decreased by about 4.9% as compared to the market sizes in 
financial year 2013. As shown in Table 5, both dependent variables ΔLOG FEETOTAL and ΔLOG 
FEEPARENT have increased by about 0.2% and 0.7% respectively as compared to financial year 
2013. The change of client size variables of ΔSALE and ΔASSETS and Assets have decreased 
with a smaller number of 0.02% and 0.06%, respectively.  The change of the client inherent risk 
variables such as ΔCATA, ΔLEV, and  ΔQUICK have increased by a small amount of 0.09%, 
0.18%, and 0.01% respectively, where ΔOPINION and ΔLOSS,  have decreased by 2.8% and 
12%, respectively. The change in client complexity variables ΔNSEG and ΔFOREIGN shows 
decrease of 2% and 4.7%, respectively. 
In Table 6, Industries descriptive are given showing the frequencies, medians and means of total 
assets by industries.  
The industry with the highest frequency is the Material industry with 729 companies or about 
40% of the total dataset.  As shown in Table 6, the Bank industry has the highest mean of total 
assets which shows that the Bank industry is comparatively much larger than other industries. 
Although, there is only 13 companies in the banking industry out of total sample size of 1836.   
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Table 7 shows the MARKET SIZE by city for financial year 2013. In Table 7, the total numbers of 
the companies located in a city, sums of their total assets and the sums of their sales are shown. In 
Table 7 only Australian cities have been considered. Sydney has the highest sum of total assets 
and the highest sum of total revenues. Sydney has the biggest MARKET SIZE as measured by 
total assets followed by Melbourne and then Brisbane. In the case of MARKET SIZE measured by 
sales, Sydney has biggest market size followed by Perth and then Melbourne. 
However Perth has the highest numbers of companies 730, which is about 39.7% of the total 
sample size. As Table 7 shows Perth has a relatively smaller market size in spite of its highest 
frequency, which indicates smaller average size for the companies located in Perth. 
In Table 8, Industries descriptive statistics shows the frequencies, medians and means of total 
assets by industries for change variables. The industry with the highest frequency is the Materials 
industry, Materials industry, with 588 companies, which is 39.4% of the total dataset.   
Table 6 indicates that 18 industries out of the 24 industries have increased their total assets in 
financial 2014 as compared to financial year 2013.  
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Table 6: Industry Descriptive Statistics (1) – Number and Total Assets 
Industry 
Number 
Industry Name No. of  companies             Median                             Mean 
 
1 Automobile & Components                                7 11056000 34268010 
2 Banks 13 3629741932 236491214873 
3 Capital Goods 101 75076000 433031095 
4 Commercial & Professional Services 57 60651964 536429909 
5 Consumer Durables & Apparel 25 59063000 185089097 
6 Consumer Services 35 92865500 903217287 
7 Diversified Financials 128 53563000 2161296838 
8 Energy 248 23937000 404285142 
9 Food & Staples Retailing 4 22250200000 21806457118 
10 Food Beverage & Tobacco 36 67979500 618306749 
11 Health Care Equipment & Services 53 18389000 385984058 
12 Household & Personal Products 3 93004000 110862333 
13 Insurance 9 1633647000 32358301125 
14 Materials 729 13187000 630907762 
15 Media 29 43538500 2800897838 
16 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & 
Life Sciences 
59 12623000 135871379 
17 Real Estate 76 324076000 1856212836 
18 Retailing 37 189306500 549521018 
19 Semiconductors & Semiconductor 
Equipment 
3 19090000 58052522 
20 Software & Services 59 33779000 115415065 
21 Technology Hardware & Equipment 20 17905000 57937640 
22 Telecommunication Services 24 154102911 2093006967 
23 Transportation 23 674477000 3659914090 
24 Utilities 29 89924500 1259667736 
 Other                           27                      
 Total         1836   
 
 
 
 ` 
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Table 7: MARKET SIZE (1) 
CITY No. OF COMPANIES      SUM OF ASSETS SUM OF SALES 
 
 
ADELAIDE 
 
77 
 
93645390242 
 
31943311143 
BRISBANE 167 293919413513 64536487038 
CAIRNS 3 136489000 5457142000 
CANBERRA 3 192255000 26185078 
DARWIN 1 36387000 37000 
GOLD COAST 3 104374838 1032948930 
HOBART 5 4359046932 434583230 
LAUNCESTON 1 50596000 48349000 
MELBOURNE 295 2021939292572 125928835550 
NEWCASTLE 10 2606671242 267345555 
PERTH 730 175011091287 231834751448 
SYDNEY 486 23064366037692 252990567736 
TOWNSVILLE 2 55461000 1361420000 
WARRNAMBOOL 1 306564000 10149000 
WOLLONGONG 
 
1 9346000 12532 
Others 
 
51   
TOTAL 1836   
        
 
 
 
 ` 
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Table 8: Industry Descriptive Statistics (2) - Number and Changes of Total Assets 
Industry 
Number 
Industry Name  No. of 
companies 
                    Mean                  Median 
 
1 Materials 582 33525598 456078 
2 Food Beverage & Tobacco 27 -28091127 -688860 
3 Energy 182 5438690 802147 
4 Diversified Financials 108 -123931525 -5614500 
5 Commercial & Professional 
Services 
52 -16091727 469809 
6 Health Care Equipment & Services 47 33789992 -2284061 
7 Software & Services 53 84802147 -2934000 
8 Real Estate 65 26432951 -17411000 
9 Capital Goods 73 99997917 1723000 
10 Utilities 23 295406135 -13586814 
11 Consumer Durables & Apparel 15 -14690919 264350 
12 Telecommunication Services 23 84834607 -7164129 
13 Retailing 29 16221819 -6019000 
14 Consumer Services 25 66510555 -9261000 
15 Food & Staples Retailing 4 98493165431 -19929350000 
16 Technology Hardware & Equipment 17 -18626952 404488 
17 Media 21 -10392471 473516 
18 Automobile & Components 6 1927018 -1338264 
19 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & 
Life Sciences 
51 768538307 -393353 
20 Transportation 18 245376144 -15711000 
21 Insurance 7 1843735714 -84027000 
22 
23 
Banks 
Household & Personal Products                     
10 
2 
22067054700 
1913627 
-2201299465 
-1192000 
22 Semiconductor & semiconductor 
Equipments   
Other   
Total                 
                         2 
 
                       22 
                   1465 
-14485094                    2136014 
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CHAPTER 4  
ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL 
 
The OLS regression model used to examine the association of audit fees and market size is 
similar to the model proposed by Francis et al. (2005) and Francis and Stokes (2003). However, 
total fees is more commonly used in audit literature, but here in this study, fees paid to the parent 
entity auditor is used to assess the robustness of results. The model as shown in section 0 is 
estimated with industry and year dummy variables, which are defined in Table 4 and section 0. 
The results of estimating the OLS regression model using two measures of MARKET SIZE are 
reported separately in Table 9 and Table 10. 
Table 9 shows the results of the OLS regression model with audit fees paid to all auditors 
(FEETOTAL) as the dependent variable, and Table 10 shows the results of the model with audit fees 
paid to the auditor of parent entity (FEEPARENT) as dependent variable.  
In Table 9 and Table 10, Column (III) and column (V) reports the estimated regression 
coefficients of equation (1) where column (IV) and column (VI) report the p-values, using 
MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) and MARKET SIZE (SALE) as independent variable respectively. 
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Table 9: Regression Results for Audit Fees paid to the Auditor of Group Entity 
(FEETOTAL) 
Note: The table presents OLS regression results for Audit fee paid to total entities (FEETOTAL). Column of 
(III) in the table reports the values for MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) used as independent variable where 
column (V) which happened to the right side in the table, reports the values when the MARKET SIZE 
(SALE) is used as independent variable. P-values are given in column (IV) and column (VI). See Table 4 
section 0 for the definitions of the independent variables. P-values, less than 0.001 are shown as 0.001 
  
 VARIABLES 
 
              (I) 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
(II) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(III) 
P-
VALUES 
(IV) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(V) 
 
P-
VALUES 
(VI) 
 ASSETS + 0.258 0.001 0.262  0.001 
 CATA + 0.290 0.001 0.313  0.001 
 LEV + 0.039 0.001 0.045  0.001 
 FOREIGN + 0.074 0.001 0.062  0.002 
 MSHAREPAR + 0.304 0.001 0.296  0.001 
 MARKET SIZE     
(ASSETS) 
+ 0.102 0.001 -  - 
 MARKET SIZE     
(SALES) 
+ - - 0.120  0.001 
 NSEG +  0.389 0.001  0.407  0.001 
 QUICK - -0.208 0.008 -0.229  0.004 
 REPORTLAG +  0.039 0.524  0.002  0.973 
 ROA -  0.021 0.001 -0.020  0.001 
 SALE  +  0.068 0.001  0.071  0.001 
 BIG4 +  0.193 0.001  0.203  0.001 
 LOSS                                +  0.006 0.706  0.260  0.793 
 NONJUNE +  0.075 0.001  0.0831  0.001 
 OPINION                         +  0.064 0.001  0.068  0.001 
  
Adjusted R
2 
  
76.4%                                       
  
75.7% 
  
 N 
Industry Dummy 
Year Dummy                                                           
 1836 
Yes 
Yes 
 1836 
Yes 
Yes  
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Table 10: Regression Results for Audit Fees paid to the Auditor of Parent Entities 
(FEEParent) 
 
 VARIABLES 
 
(I) 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
(II) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(III) 
P-
VALUES 
(IV) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(V) 
P-
VALUES 
(VI) 
 ASSETS + 0.249 0.001 0.253 0.001 
 CATA + 0.267 0.001 0.287 0.001 
 LEV + 0.042 0.001 0.047 0.001 
 FOREIGN + 0.011 0.511 -0.001 0.930 
 MSHAREPAR + 0.292 0.001 0.276 0.001 
 MARKET SIZE     
(ASSETS) 
+ 0.102 0.001 - - 
 MARKET SIZE     
(SALES) 
+ - - 0.110 0.001 
 NSEG +  0.342 0.001  0.360 0.001 
 QUICK - -0.192 0.013 -0.211 0.007 
 REPORTLAG + -0.005 0.926 -0.042 0.501 
 ROA - 0.020 0.001  -0.020 0.001 
 SALE  +  0.063 0.001 0.066 0.001 
 BIG4 +  0.181 0.001 0.191 0.001 
 LOSS                                +  0.003 0.850 0.001 0.938 
 NONJUNE +  0.053 0.004 0.060 0.002 
 OPINION                         
+  0.066 0.001 0.071 
0.001 
 
 Adjusted R
2  
N 
Year Dummy 
Industry Dummy 
 75.8% 
1836 
Yes 
Yes 
 74.5% 
1836 
Yes 
Yes 
 
       
Note: The table presents OLS regression results for Audit fee (FEEPARENT). Column (III) in the table 
reports the values for MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) where column (V) which happened to the right side in the 
table, reports the values for the MARKET SIZE (SALE) used in the group of independent variable in the 
model. P-values are given in column (IV) and column (VI). P-values, less than 0.001 are shown as 0.001 
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Column (II) in Table 9 and Table 10 presents the expected signs of the coefficients, which are 
positive for all variables in the model except for QUICK, REPORTLAG, ROA and LOSS. Table 9 
and Table 10 show that all statistically significant variables are consistent with the expected signs 
except for ROA in the model with MARKET SIZE (ASSETS). The results also show variables with 
p-values less than 0.005, which indicate a significant relation with the audit fees. All control 
variables in the model are statistically significant except for QUICK, REPORTLAG, and LOSS, 
and FOREIGN is only statistically significant while using FEETOTAL as the dependent variable. 
 Table 9 and Table 10 report consistent results for the coefficient signs of all variables, indicating 
that the results are quite robust. 
All control variables in the model which are statistically significant have a positive impact on the 
audit fees (FEE) except ROA in MARKET SIZE (SALE) group. 
The adjusted R
2 
values for all four models are higher than 74%, which means that the model 
explains of above 74% of the variation fees, which is consistent with prior studies (Ferguson et 
al. 2003). 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) are calculated to ascertain if multicollinearity is likely to cause 
problem in the regression analysis.  The VIFs for QUICK and CATA both higher than 14, which 
suggests multicollinearity could be causing problems. Other variables have VIF value close to 
one.  However, the coefficient estimates for the variances are consistent with expectations and 
both variables are established variables in the audit literature (see for example, Ferguson et al 
2003 with Australian data and Mnutti-Meza 2013 with US data). Therefore I retain QUICK and 
CATA in the models for my main tests. It should be noted that the inferences about the MARKET 
SIZE coefficients are unchanged if either one of the variables QUICK or CATA are omitted from 
the model. 
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The regression results suggest that the MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) and MARKET SIZE (SALE) 
coefficient are both statistically significant at a level of 0.005 and have a positive impact on audit 
fees. The relations with audit fees are not only statistically significant, but are also economically 
important. For example, a one standard deviation increase in MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) is 
associated with an increase of about 6.47
1
percent in audit fees. Though the economical 
importance of the MARKET SIZE (SALE) is comparatively smaller than the economic importance 
of Market size (Assets), but economical importance of market sizes associated with each audit 
fees of group entities (FEETOTAL) and parent entities (FEEPARENT) are not different in term of 
statistical significance of the variables and sign of coefficients. For instance, a one standard 
deviation increase in MARKET SIZE (SALE) is associated with an increase of about 4.08 percent 
in audit fees (FEETOTAL) and an increase of about 3.74 percent in audit fees (FEEPARENT). 
The coefficient for the ASSETS variable and audit fees is statistically significant (as seen in Table 
9 and Table 10), and the variable has also the highest economically importance in the model.  For 
example, a one standard deviation increase in ASSETS is associated with an increase of about 32 
percent in audit fees (FEETOTAL) and an increase of about 31 percent in audit fees (FEEPARENT). 
The economical importance of ASSETS in relation with audit fees (FEETOTAL) and audit fees 
(FEEPARENT) are same either ASSETS is used with MARKET SIZE (SALE) or MARKET SIZE 
(ASSETS). 
                                                          
 
 
 
1
 This is estimated by  𝑒(𝑧∗𝑟)    -1  where “e” is the exponential function; “z” is the regression coefficient 
on the relevant continuous variable and r is standard deviation. For example, if the variable is MARKET 
SIZE (ASSETS) as in the above case it is, then z is the regression co-efficient on MARKET SIZE(ASSETS); 
and r is the standard deviation of MARKET SIZE (ASSETS). This procedure is described in Simon and 
Francis (1988).
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These results are in contradiction to my hypotheses, which I have developed in section 0. So I 
reject my Null Hypothesis (Ho) that market size has no impact on the audit fees. The results of the 
OLS regression model as discussed above in details show that market size was positively 
correlated to the audit fees. To check the reliability of the relation more precisely between audit 
fees and market size, I use a client fixed effect model in our study. The results of the fixed effect 
model are given in Table 11, and Table 12. 
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Table 11: Regression Results for Change Audit Fees paid to the Auditor of Group Entity 
(ΔFEETOTAL) 
 
Note: The table presents client fixed effect regression results for the difference of Audit fee paid to group 
entities (FEETOTAL) of financial year 2013 and financial year 2014.The dependent variable is ΔFEETOTAL, 
natural logarithm of change of audit fees paid to the auditor of the group entities. Column  (III) in the table 
reports the values for ΔMARKET SIZE (ASSETS) used as independent variable where column (V) side 
reports the values when the ΔMARKET SIZE (SALE)is used as independent variable. P-values are given in 
column (IV) and column (VI). P-values, less than 0.001 are shown as 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 VARIABLES 
 
                  (I) 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
(II) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(III) 
P-
VALUES 
(IV) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(V) 
 P-
VALUES 
(VI) 
 Δ ASSETS + 0.186 0.001 0.180  0.001 
 Δ CATA + 0.039 0.651 0.027  0.749 
 Δ LEV + 0.016 0.428 0.190  0.363 
 Δ FOREIGN + 0.046 0.195 0.036  0.310 
 Δ MSHAREPAR + 0.280 0.001 0.305  0.001 
 Δ MARKET SIZE     
(ASSETS) 
+ 0.045 0.010 -  - 
 Δ MARKET SIZE     
(SALES) 
+ - - 0.091  0.006 
 Δ NSEG +  -0.014 0.739 0.016  0.708 
 Δ QUICK - - 0.003 0.970 -0.006  0.943 
 Δ REPORTLAG + 0.108 0.032 0.123  0.014 
 Δ ROA -  -0.084 0.001 -0.081  0.001 
 Δ SALE  + 0.017 0.127 0.016  0.161 
 Δ BIG4 + -0.004 0.722 0.002  0.819 
 Δ LOSS                                + 0.0004 0.959 0.001  0.929 
 Δ NONJUNE +  0.016 0.719 0.010  0.809 
 Δ OPINION                         + 0.004 0.719  0.005  0.634 
  
Adjusted R
2 
  
12.9%                                       
  
12.20% 
  
 N 
Industry Dummy 
Year Dummy                                                           
 1465 
No 
Yes
 1465 
No 
Yes  
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Table 12: Regression Results for Change Audit Fees paid to the Auditor of Group Entity 
(ΔFEEPARENT) 
 
Note: The table presents fixed effect regression results for the difference of Audit fee paid to Parent 
entities (FEEPARENT) of financial year 2013 and financial year 2014.The dependent variable is ΔFEEPARENT, 
natural logarithm of change of audit fees paid to the auditor of the parent entities. Column (III) in the table 
reports the values for ΔMARKET SIZE (ASSETS) used as independent variable where column (V) which 
happened at the most right side in the table reports the values when the ΔMARKET SIZE (SALE)  is used 
as independent variable. P-values are given in column (IV) and column (VI). P-values, less than 0.001 are 
shown as 0.001 
 
 
 VARIABLES 
 
                (I) 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
(II) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(III) 
P-
VALUES 
(IV) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(V) 
 
P-
VALUES 
(VI) 
 Δ ASSETS + 0.164 0.001 0.160  0.001 
 Δ CATA + 0.045 0.612 0.038  0.672 
 Δ LEV + 0.014 0.500 0.014  0.444 
 Δ FOREIGN + 0.027 0.464 0.018  0.620 
 Δ MSHAREPAR 
+ 0.240 0.001 0.261  0.001 
 Δ MARKET SIZE     
(ASSETS) + 0.035 0.050 -  - 
 Δ MARKET SIZE     
(SALES) + - - 0.062  0.044 
 Δ NSEG + 0.040 0.348 0.040  0.380 
 Δ QUICK -  -0.026 0.738 -0.021  0.847 
 Δ REPORTLAG + 0.069 0.157 0.082  0.105 
 Δ ROA - -0.072 0.001 -0.071  0.001 
 Δ SALE  + 0.024 0.078 0.020  0.091 
 Δ BIG4 + -0.006 0.629 -0.001  0.993 
 Δ LOSS                                        + 0.005 0.689 0.005  0.665 
 Δ NONJUNE + 0.024 0.599 0.019  0.670 
 Δ OPINION                         + 0.009 0.461 0.010  0.397 
  
Adjusted R
2 
  
10.6%                                       
  
10.11% 
  
 N 
Industry Dummy 
Year Dummy                                                           
 1465 
 No 
Yes
 1465 
 No 
Yes  
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 Table11 and Table 12, shows the fixed effect regression results. The change in MARKET SIZE 
(SALE) and MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) are positive and significant at the 0.05 level. These 
results are consistent with the results of the OLS regression models shown in Table 9 and Table 
10.  Table 11 and Table 12, also show that the ΔASSETS, ΔROA, and ΔMSHAREPAR are 
significant and consistent with the OLS regression model whereas ΔREPORTLAG and ΔLOSS are 
insignificant and also consistent with the OLS regression model. The variables other than the 
above mentioned variables are inconsistent with the OLS regression results and I don’t have any 
explanation for the inconsistency. These results for the market size variables are also consistent 
with the results of the Pearson correlation matrixes as given in the Table 13.  
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Table 13: AUDIT FEES SAMPLE PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX (1) 
 
VARIABLES  FEEPARENT FEETOTAL ASSET LEV ROA 
MARKET 
SIZE(SALE)        
MARKET 
SIZE(Asset) 
FEEPARENT  
      FEETOTAL           0.98* 
      ASSET 0.67* 0.68* 
     LEV 0.023 0.018 -0.21*
    ROA 0.16* 0.16* 0.41* -0.59* 
   MARKET SIZE 
(SALE) 
          0.25* 0.24*         -0.062 -0.001 -0.004 
  MARKET SIZE 
(ASSETS) 
0.34* 0.34* 0.14* 0.09* 0.032  0.92*  
 
REPORTLAG 0.018 0.017 -0.32* 0.06* -0.09*      0.08* -0.10* 
QUICK -0.18* -0.18* -0.43* 0.18* -0.24* 0.017   -0.011 
OPINION -0.19* -0.19* -0.36* 0.14* -0.21* 0.001 -0.09* 
CATA -0.12* -0.12* -0.36* 0.19* -0.21* -0.003 -0.009 
NONJUNE 
 
0.14* 
 
0.16* 
 
0.15* 
 
0.05* 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.004 
 
0.07* 
FOREIGN 0.07* 0.11* 0.037 -0.008 0.006 0.065 0.038    
LOGNSEG 0.44* 0.47* 0.32* 0.008  0.05* -0.029 0.11* 
LOGSALE 0.54* 0.55* 0.74* -0.005 0.26* -0.08* 0.23* 
MSHAREPAR 0.27* 0.28* 0.21* 0.045 0.023  -0.48* -0.20* 
LOSS -0.41* -0.41* -0.50* -0.016 -0.24*   0.09* -0.18* 
BIG4 0.39* 0.40* 0.37* -0.019 0.10* -0.09* 0.12* 
(Table 13 is continued on the next page) 
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Table 13 continued 
 
Notes: The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in regression analysis. The variables are defined in Table 4 and 
section 0. 
 * denotes two-tailed significance at the .10 level. 
 
 
REPORTLAG QUICK OPINION CATA NONJUNE FOREIGN LOGNSEG LOGSALE MSHAREPAR LOSS 
           REPORTLAG 
          
QUICK 0.018 
         OPINION 0.200 -0.058         
CATA -0.002 0.957 -0.08*        
NONJUNE -0.044 -0.026 -0.06* -0.017       
FOREIGN 0.104 0.028 0.05* 0.017 0.15*      
LOGNSEG -0.008 -0.076 -0.07* -0.035      0.025  0.28*     
LOGSALE -0.226 -0.107 -0.37* -0.07* 0.12* -0.001 0.36*    
MSHAREPAR 
-0.117 -0.028 -0.10* 0.007 0.06* -0.010 0.15* 0.28*   
LOSS 0.241 0.129 0.32* 0.07* -0.08*  0.05* -0.16* -0.57* -0.23*  
BIG 
-0.191 -0.118 -0.13* -0.10* 0.11* -0.028 0.16* 0.36* 0.13* -0.23* 
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The univariate relation between the dependent variables audit fees (FEEPARENT) and audit fees 
(FEETOTAL), and all the independent variables shown in the correlation matrix. These relations are 
consistent with the results in the OLS regression models, as shown in Table 9 and Table 10, 
except for the control variable LEV and the indicator variables LOSS. The control variable LEV is 
the only independent variable that is insignificant at the level of 0.1 in the correlation matrix. 
The relation of the market size (assets) and market size (sale) with the dependent variables audit 
fees (FEEPARENT) and audit fees (FEETOTAL) are significant in the correlation matrix, which are 
also consistent with the OLS regression model results. 
The results of Pearson correlation matrix also show that all the correlation coefficients are 
consistent with the OLS regression model results except for CATA and OPINION. For CATA and 
OPINION correlation coefficients are negative in the correlation matrix, which shows their 
negative correlation with the audit fees. The correlation coefficients for both MARKET SIZE 
(ASSETS) and MARKET SIZE (SALE) with audit fees (FEEPARENT)and audit fees (FEETOTAL)  are 
positives and consistent with the result of OLS regression model. The correlation matrix also 
reports a strong correlation between MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) and MARKET SIZE (SALE). The 
value of correlation coefficient for both market size measures is 0.924. 
Table 14 reports the Pearson correlation coefficient values for difference variables for financial 
year 2013 and financial year 2014, which are calculated for measuring the strength of correlation 
of audit fees (FEEPARENT) and audit fees (FEETOTAL) to the variables used in fixed effect 
regression model, while using statistical software MINITAB. The relation of the dependent 
variables audit fees (FEEPARENT) and audit fees (FEETOTAL), with all independent variables used in 
fixed effect regression model, are consistent with the results in the OLS regression models, as 
shown in Table 9 and Table 10, and with correlation matrix used for financial year 2013 data as 
given in Table 13, except for market size (assets) variable that is insignificant in Table 14. The 
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consistency in results show the authenticity of the relation between market size and audit fees, 
which was the primary objectives of this study. Table 14 also indicates that the changes in audit 
fees are strongly correlated with one another have correlation coefficient values of 0.89 which 
close to the perfect correlation values of (+1), whereas the changes in the measures of market 
sizes are weakly correlated with a values of correlation coefficient of 0.22.  
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Table 14: AUDIT FEES SAMPLE PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX (2) 
(Table 14 is continued on the next page) 
 
ΔVARIABLES  ΔFEEPARENT ΔFEETOTAL ΔASSET ΔLEV ΔROA 
ΔMARKET 
SIZE(SALE)        
ΔMARKET 
SIZE(Asset) 
ΔFEEPARENT  
      ΔFEETOTAL 0.89* 
      ΔASSET 0.17* 0.20* 
     ΔLEV 0.016 0.056 -0.23*
    ΔROA -0.040 -0.05*             0.46*   -0.25*  
  ΔMARKET SIZE 
(SALE) 
0.05* 0.06*              0.09* -0.003 
                   0.032 
 
 ΔMARKET SIZE 
(ASSETS) 
 
0.026 
                
0.032 
 
0.007 
 
0.06* 
 
0.004 
 
         0.22* 
 
 
ΔREPORTLAG 0.06* 0.07* 0.04* 0.13* 0.006 0.074     0.09* 
ΔQUICK 0.023 0.041 -0.22* 0.15* -0.12* 0.002   -0.017 
ΔOPINION 0.040 0.031 -0.06* 0.14* -0.09* 0.04*      0.06* 
ΔCATA 0.025 0.042 -0.22* 0.18* -0.12* 0.009    -0.017 
ΔNONJUNE 0.07* 0.06* 0.05*           0.06*       0.026 0.09* 0.10*   
ΔFOREIGN 0.07* 0.09* 0.06*    0.035 0.06* 0.14*      0.038 
ΔLOGNSEG 0.09* 0.63* 0.07* 0.06* 0.016 0.036 0.043 
ΔLOGSALE 0.10* 0.10* 0.22* -0.08* 0.01* 0.05* -0.021 
ΔMSHAREPAR 0.18* 0.20* 0.25* 0.06* 0.035 -0.27* -0.16* 
ΔLOSS 0.046 0.05* -0.07* -0.04* -0.32* 0.05* -0.029 
ΔBIG4 -0.001 0.009 -0.027 0.06* 0.003 -0.07* 0.10* 
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Table 14 continued  
 
 
 
 
Notes: The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in regression analysis. The variables are defined in Table 4 and 
section 0. 
 * denotes two-tailed significance at the .10 level 
 
 
               ΔREPORTLAG 
     
ΔQUICK ΔOPINION ΔCATA ΔNONJUNE ΔFOREIGN ΔLOGNSEG ΔLOGSALE ΔMSHAREPAR ΔLOSS 
           ΔREPORTLAG 
          
ΔQUICK 0.06* 
 
        ΔOPINION 0.06* -0.09* 
        ΔCATA 0.07* 0.97* -0.10*   
     ΔNONJUNE 0.04* 0.06* 0.12* -0.06* 
      ΔFOREIGN 0.09* 0.004 0.18* -0.000 0.24*
     ΔLOGNSEG 0.01* 0.04* -0.005 0.030      0.09*  0.034 
    ΔLOGSALE 0.010  0.06* -0.05* -0.06* 0.041 0.023 0.07*
   ΔMSHAREPAR 
0.08* 0.07* -0.017 0.07* 0.11* 0.12* 0.11* 0.032
  ΔLOSS 0.026 0.035 0.26* 0.04* 0.14*  0.30* 0.006 -0.10* 0.031
 ΔBIG 0.040 0.05* -0.07* -0.04* 0.06* 0.083 0.037 -0.031 0.04*    0.09* 
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4.1        ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
4.1.1 Additional OLS estimate:    
I also estimated the model using 2014 data but do not include these results in the main results 
because at the time of writing the complete data set could not be obtained. The results shown in 
the Appendix A and Appendix B indicate that market size and audit fees are positively related 
and statistically significant at level 0.05. The results using 2014 data are consistent for 75% of the 
variables used in the models with the OLS result using 2013 data. I conclude that the positive 
relation between audit fees and market size is a robust result. 
 
4.1.2 Normality Check:  
Residual plots are used to examine the normality and error independence assumptions of the OLS 
regression model. Four different residual plots are shown in Appendix C, to look at the residual in 
four different ways. The normal plot of residuals verifies the assumption that the residuals are 
normally distributed. I also checked the normality of individual variables and found them 
normally distributed. The residual versus fits plot shows that the residuals appear to be random.  
The weak correlation of the residuals with each other is shown in the appendix by the residual 
versus the order of data plot. The histogram of the residuals determines the skewness of the data. 
The histogram of the residuals doesn’t report skewness in the data set. Overall, the residual 
analysis suggests that the assumptions of normality and independence of errors are not violated.  
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4.1.2 Model specification check:  
I used the Minitab best subset procedure to identify the best fitting regression model and the 
procedure suggested that the LOSS variable be omitted when FEETOTAL is used as depended 
variable and NONJUNE variable be omitted when FEEPARENT is used as depended variable. The 
best subset procedure suggested two different models for two different measures of depended 
variables. However, given that the LOSS and NONJUNE are both established dummy variable in 
the audit literature (see for example, Ferguson et al 2003 with Australian data and Mnutti-Meza 
2013 with US data), I retain both LOSS and NONJUNE in the models for my main tests. It should 
be noted that the inferences about the MARKET SIZE coefficients are unchanged if LOSS and 
NONJUNE is omitted. The results of the best subset regression are given in Appendix D and 
Appendix E. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, evidence on the association between audit fees and market size has been shown.  
I used two different measures of the market size, namely MARKET SIZE (ASSETS) and MARKET 
SIZE (SALE) and find their relations with audit fees to be positive. I also use two different 
dependent variables, namely audit fees (FEEPARENT) and audit fees (FEETOTAL) to check the 
robustness of the results. Consistent evidence is obtained from using these different variables. 
It was found that the relation between audit fees and market size is not only statistically 
significant but also has economic importance. For example, my estimates of a one standard 
deviation in market size range from 3.7% to 6.5%. The results of the two models are consistent 
with one another. The client fixed effect model is used to reduce the threat of omitted variable 
bias. The correlation matrix results are generally consistent with the results of both the OLS and 
the fixed effect model.  
It is also found that the relations between audit fees with various independent variables used in 
the model such as CATA, LEV, FOREIGN, MSHAREPAR had statistical significance except 
QUICK, REPORTLAG, and LOSS, which were statistically insignificant. For all significant 
variables the coefficients had the same sign as expected except for ROA. Positive signs were 
expected for market sizes in relation with audit fees, which were found to be positive in the 
results of both regression models. 
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This study has important implications for regulators, audit clients, auditors and researchers.  For 
regulators, it would seem that drawing conclusions about the implications of reduced audit fees 
for audit quality should incorporate a consideration of market size. For audit clients, other factors 
equal, shifting to smaller-sized audit markets could result in cost savings.  Although it is 
important to note here that audit quality may also change if a client moves to a smaller market. 
And there are other, non-audit-related factors that clients should consider before moving to 
another market such as, access to suppliers, however, capitalizes resources and so on.  For 
auditors, there may be more potential to adopt different competitive strategies in larger markets.  
For example, given that larger markets have higher fees, cost savings may be easier to find, 
suggesting that some more efficient auditors could adopt a strategy to compete on price more 
easily in larger markets.  For researchers, estimating the commonly-used audit fee model from 
Simunic (1980), it would seem that market size proxy is an important variable to include in the 
model, to reduce the possibility of coefficient bias. I leave these possibilities for future research. 
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Appendixes 
         Appendix A 
Regression Results for Audit Fees paid to the Auditor of Group Entity (FEEPARENT) -2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VARIABLES 
 
(I) 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
(II) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(III) 
P-
VALUES 
(IV) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(V) 
P-
VALUES 
(VI) 
 ASSETS + 0.269 0.001 0.276 0.001 
 CATA + 0.086 0.273 0.108 0.175 
 LEV + 0.045 0.001 0.480 0.001 
 FOREIGN + 0.036 0.070 0.033 0.105 
 MSHAREPAR + 0.345 0.001 0.345 0.001 
 MARKET SIZE     
(ASSETS) 
+ 0.113 0.001 - - 
 MARKET SIZE     
(SALES) 
+ - - 0.104 0.001 
 NSEG +  0.417 0.001  0.413 0.001 
 QUICK - 0.041 0.597 0.022 0.781 
 REPORTLAG + 0.148 0.009 0.162 0.005 
 ROA - -0.019 0.001  -0.019 0.001 
 SALE  +  0.088 0.001 0.091 0.001 
 BIG4 +  0.070 0.001 0.064 0.001 
 LOSS                                +  0.061 0.001 0.060 0.001 
 NONJUNE +  0.087 0.020 0.093 0.015 
 OPINION                         +                                   0.045 0.007               0.050         0.003 
 Adjusted R
2  
N 
Year Dummy 
Industry Dummy 
 80.34% 
1492 
Yes 
Yes 
 80.22% 
1492 
Yes 
Yes 
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Appendix B 
Regression Results for Audit Fees paid to the Auditor of Group Entity (FEETOTAL) -2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VARIABLES 
 
              (I) 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
(II) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(III) 
P-
VALUES 
(IV) 
CO-
EFFICIENT 
(V) 
 
P-
VALUES 
(VI) 
 ASSETS + 0.276 0.001 0.282  0.001 
 CATA + 0.120 0.129 0.143  0.075 
 LEV + 0.045 0.001 0.048  0.001 
 FOREIGN + 0.011 0.001 0.017  0.001 
 MSHAREPAR + 0.348 0.001 0.296  0.001 
 MARKET SIZE     
(ASSETS) 
+ 0.112 0.001 -  - 
 MARKET SIZE     
(SALES) 
+ - - 0.109  0.001 
 NSEG +  0.451 0.001  0.446  0.001 
 QUICK - 0.017 0.831 -0.003  0.963 
 REPORTLAG +  0.183 0.001  0.194  0.001 
 ROA -  -0.019 0.001 -0.019  0.001 
 SALE  +  0.094 0.001  0.097  0.001 
 BIG4 +  0.075 0.001  0.081  0.001 
 LOSS                                +  0.073 0.001  0.718  0.001 
 NONJUNE +  0.090 0.017  0.095  0.013 
 OPINION                         +  0.044 0.009  0.050  0.004 
  
Adjusted R
2 
  
81.5%                                       
  
80.8% 
  
 N 
Industry Dummy 
Year Dummy                                                           
 1492 
Yes 
Yes 
 1492 
Yes 
Yes  
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Appendix C 
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Appendix D 
Best Subsets Regression:  
 
                                                      R 
                                                      E 
                                                      P   O   N F L L 
                                                      O   P   O O O O M 
                                                A     R Q I   N R G G S 
                                                S     T U N C J E N S H L 
                                                S L R L I I A U I S A A O B 
            R-Sq    R-Sq                        E E O A C O T N G E L R S I 
Vars  R-Sq  (adj)  (pred)    Mallows Cp    S    T V A G K N A E N G E E S G 
   1  59.2   59.1    59.0       854.0  0.32250  X 
   1  54.1   54.1    53.9      1165.5  0.34182                      X 
   2  64.8   64.7    64.6       509.2  0.29962  X                   X 
   2  63.5   63.5    63.3       584.7  0.30477  X                 X 
   3  67.6   67.5    67.4       334.4  0.28728  X                 X X 
   3  67.0   66.9    66.8       371.9  0.28996  X X                 X 
   4  69.6   69.5    69.3       215.2  0.27852  X X               X X 
   4  69.4   69.3    69.1       227.5  0.27944  X   X             X X 
   5  70.8   70.7    70.5       141.5  0.27294  X X               X X     X 
   5  70.5   70.4    70.2       159.0  0.27426  X   X             X X     X 
   6  71.6   71.5    71.2        95.5  0.26937  X X               X X X   X 
   6  71.4   71.2    71.0       109.7  0.27045  X X         X     X X     X 
   7  72.1   71.9    71.7        67.7  0.26715  X X         X     X X X   X 
   7  72.0   71.9    71.6        72.8  0.26754  X X X             X X X   X 
   8  72.6   72.4    72.1        38.5  0.26480  X X       X X     X X X   X 
   8  72.5   72.3    72.0        45.0  0.26531  X X X       X     X X X   X 
   9  73.0   72.8    72.5        17.3  0.26306  X X X     X X     X X X   X 
   9  72.7   72.6    72.3        29.9  0.26405  X X X   X X       X X X   X 
  10  73.1   72.9    72.5        13.0  0.26265  X X X     X X X   X X X   X 
  10  73.0   72.8    72.5        14.8  0.26279  X X X   X X X     X X X   X 
  11  73.1   72.9    72.6        10.3  0.26235  X X X   X X X X   X X X   X 
  11  73.1   72.9    72.5        14.9  0.26271  X X X     X X X   X X X X X 
  12  73.1   72.9    72.5        12.2  0.26242  X X X   X X X X   X X X X X 
  12  73.1   72.9    72.6        12.2  0.26242  X X X   X X X X X X X X   X 
  13  73.1   72.9    72.5        14.1  0.26249  X X X X X X X X   X X X X X 
  13  73.1   72.9    72.5        14.1  0.26249  X X X   X X X X X X X X X X 
  14  73.1   72.9    72.5        16.0  0.26256  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Response is FEE(PARENT) 
Market Size (SALE)is included in all models 
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Appendix E 
Best Subsets Regression:  
 
 
                                                      R 
                                                      E 
                                                      P   O   N F L L 
                                                      O   P   O O O O M 
                                                A     R Q I   N R G G S 
                                                S     T U N C J E N S H L 
                                                S L R L I I A U I S A A O B 
             R-Sq    R-Sq                       E E O A C O T N G E L R S I 
Vars  R-Sq  (adj)  (pred)    Mallows Cp    S    T V A G K N A E N G E E S G 
   1  59.9   59.8    59.7       998.1  0.33476  X 
   1  54.9   54.8    54.7      1332.3  0.35511                      X 
   2  65.6   65.5    65.4       619.4  0.31005  X                   X 
   2  65.3   65.3    65.1       639.0  0.31138  X                 X 
   3  69.3   69.2    69.1       374.7  0.29294  X                 X X 
   3  67.9   67.8    67.6       470.2  0.29972  X X               X 
   4  71.1   71.0    70.8       260.6  0.28458  X X               X X 
   4  71.0   70.9    70.7       267.4  0.28507  X   X             X X 
   5  72.2   72.1    71.9       186.6  0.27898  X X               X X     X 
   5  72.0   71.9    71.8       198.8  0.27990  X   X             X X     X 
   6  73.0   72.9    72.6       134.2  0.27493  X X               X X X   X 
   6  72.9   72.7    72.5       145.7  0.27581  X   X             X X X   X 
   7  73.5   73.4    73.1       101.9  0.27237  X X         X     X X X   X 
   7  73.4   73.3    73.0       109.5  0.27295  X   X       X     X X X   X 
   8  74.1   73.9    73.6        68.0  0.26965  X X       X X     X X X   X 
   8  74.0   73.9    73.6        70.8  0.26988  X   X     X X     X X X   X 
   9  74.4   74.3    74.0        45.4  0.26781  X X X     X X     X X X   X 
   9  74.4   74.2    73.9        50.5  0.26821  X X       X X X   X X X   X 
  10  74.7   74.6    74.2        27.8  0.26634  X X X     X X   X X X X   X 
  10  74.7   74.6    74.2        28.4  0.26639  X X X     X X X   X X X   X 
  11  74.9   74.8    74.4        16.4  0.26536  X X X     X X X X X X X   X 
  11  74.8   74.6    74.3        25.1  0.26605  X X X   X X X   X X X X   X 
  12  75.0   74.8    74.5        13.5  0.26504  X X X   X X X X X X X X   X 
  12  75.0   74.8    74.4        16.7  0.26530  X X X X   X X X X X X X   X 
  13  75.0   74.8    74.4        14.0  0.26501  X X X X X X X X X X X X   X 
  13  75.0   74.8    74.4        15.5  0.26512  X X X   X X X X X X X X X X 
  14  75.0   74.8    74.4        16.0  0.26508  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Response is FEE (Total) 
Market Size (SALE)is included in all models 
 
 
 
